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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Analysis of the Problems of Productivity and Performance of the
Port of Assab

Degree:

MSc

The port, as a compulsory meeting point between the ship and the goods, plays an essential
part in the maritime trade of country, and often than not, in the maritime trade of a region. Of
course, the latter role depends mainly on the geographical position of the port. However, the
roles that a port can play could be maintained if the port remains efficient in today’s tough
competitive environment.

The theme of this study is to analyse the major problems of performance and productivity of
the Port of Assab and come up with alternative solutions so that the port can maintain its
role to the national economy and to the maritime trade of Ethiopia. The dissertation has six
main chapters. It started by brief introduction that explains the objective of the study, the
problems faced to conduct this study and the method used to carry out the study. Chapter
two described briefly the general aspects of the Eritrea’s economy, geographical position,
history, and general aspects of the port itself.

The significance of this dissertation to the nation is indirect by drawing some
recommendations, which would improve the efficiency of the port, which in turn could lead
to reduce maritime transport costs. Chapter three deals with this matter.

Chapter four, which is the main focus of this dissertation, investigated the major causes of
lower productivity and performance of the Port of Assab especially when compared with
international standards. Shortage of skilled people in the essential fields, shortage of finance
for investment, deficiency in MIS, deficiency in supervision and motivation, and lack of
operational planning have been found to be the major problems of lower productivity in the
port.

vi

Cost-benefit analysis of alternative proposals is presented in the fifth chapter although it is
more of qualitative arguments instead of quantitative ones.

Finally, there is a conclusion and recommendations. The recommendations so suggested can
only be implemented if, and only if, the port is going to serve its traditional and historical
hinterland.

Key Words: Impact, hinterland, cost-benefit, performance, Assab Port, Eritrea,
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I. Introduction

As David Motram, former professor at WMU has stated ‘every thing is changing’.
However, it is not just a matter of change, also the rates of change are even faster
than ever. Ports in the world in general, and the Eritrean Port of Assab in particular,
have undergone tremendous changes. Organisations like the Port of Assab face two
kinds of change: internal and external. Internal changes result from changes in
internal resources. According to Motram, these internal resources include people,
things, money, procedures and time. The external factors, on the other hand, consist
of political, economic, social and technical aspects. (Motram D, 1998,)

Certainly, management has little or no control of the external factors, but it has direct
control of the internal resources. Due this fact, when selecting the topic of the
dissertation, a decision has been made to analyse the internal (institutional) problems
of productivity and performance of the Port of Assab. Taking certain measures by
management of the organisation can solve the internal problems relatively easily.
However, the external factors can hardly by changed or influenced by management.
For example, the loss of traffic that the Port of Assab has been suffering recently is
due solely to a political decision made by the main user of the port - Ethiopia.

The main objective of this dissertation is to find out the obstacles for the Port of
Assab for not achieving higher productivity and performance. It does deal with all
the internal and external causes of inefficiency but only the major institutional
problems will be dealt with.

The general reasons for limiting the subject to the analysis of major problems of
efficiency are twofold. The first concerns the availability and ease of access to data
and information. The second, and probably the most important reason, is that it is
easier to study the internal problems and come up with recommendations to solve
them.

The specific objectives of the chapters in this dissertation are the following:

1. To provide general information about and a description of the country and the
Port of Assab.
2. To analyse the problems of productivity and performance of the port.
3. To analyse the contribution of the port to the national economy.
4. To make a cost benefit analysis of alternative proposals.
5. To give proposals and recommendations for tackling the prevailing problems of
lower productivity and performance of the port.

The paper is divided into four main chapters. Chapter two describes the general
aspects of the Port of Assab. It is followed by some explanation of the role of the
port and significance of the paper in chapter three. The analysis of major problems of
productivity and performance of the Port of Assab, which is the substance of this
study, are presented in chapter four. Chapter five discusses the costs and benefits of
alternative proposals. Finally, the conclusion and recommendations are presented as
a concluding part.

The research methodology is mainly based on secondary data, except that one
questionnaire was sent to the Port Administration of Assab. That questionnaire seeks
information on issues such as:

• Main causes of equipment break down,
• Inefficiency of tallying,

2

• Maintenance policy, and
• Ship related delay causes.
All questions have effectively been answered and were helpful.

In an attempt to collect relevant information for the study, the Eritrean Maritime
Administration, the Port’s Administration, the Bank of Eritrea and the Ministry of
Finance of the State of Eritrea have been contacted. A literature review has been
made including: University of Asmara, WMU library and lecture notes, government
reports, research papers, Internet and other electronic sources such as Fair Play, ports
statistics and information, and field trip observations and hand-outs.

The main limitations of the study are lack of sufficient data especially in the costbenefit analysis part, time, and money for the purpose of telephone communication
because there is no other alternatives such as E-mail and Internet.

As explained in chapter three, it is hoped that the dissertation will contribute to
achieve higher productivity and performance in the Port of Assab and thereby to the
nation as a whole. Implementing the recommendations outlined at the end of this
dissertation could lead to the attainment and increment of the port’s contribution.
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II. General Aspects of Eritrea and the Port of Assab

This chapter will begin by giving a brief description of the economic, historical,
demographic and geographical profile of the country as a whole to give the reader a
broader picture of the country.

2.1 A Brief History of Eritrea
(Abstract from http://www.netafrica.org/eritrea/history.html , 3/13/99)
During the 1st to the 9th century, Eritrea was part of the Aksumite kingdom, a
trading state that emerged about the first century AD.

After the rise of Islam in the seventh century, the Aksumite kingdom became
internationally isolated as the Arabs gradually gained control of maritime trade in the
Red Sea.

From the 8th to the 13th century, Eritrea was part of the seven Beja kingdoms and
then from the 13th to the 16th century was part of the Bellou kingdom.

Over the centuries, other kingdoms and empires also established outposts or
exercised control over various parts of present-day Eritrea. These include the
Ptolemic Egyptians (3rd C. BC), the Sennar kingdom (16th-19th C.), the Abyssinian
kingdom (14th-18th C., 19th C.), the Adal Sultanate (15th-16th C.), the Aussa
sultanate (16th-19th C.), Egypt under Muhammad Ali (18th C.), and the Ottoman
Turks (16th-19th C.).
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All of the area now known as Eritrea was gradually united under Italian rule. The
king of Italy issued a decree creating Eritrea on January 1, 1890. Italy established an
administrative structure and a transport and communications network in Eritrea.
Italian settlers set up plantations and industries.

During World War II, the British defeated the Italians and established a protectorate
over Eritrea. Eritrea became an important centre for British and American operations
in the region during the war.

The 1950 United Nations resolution federating Eritrea with Ethiopia went into effect.
The resolution ignored Eritreans' desire for independence but guaranteed them some
democratic rights and autonomy.

The armed struggle for independence began after years of peaceful protest against
Ethiopian violations of Eritrean democratic rights and autonomy produced no
improvement in a deteriorating situation.

Using armed force, Ethiopia's emperor, Haile Sellassie, unilaterally dissolved the
Eritrean parliament and annexed the country.

After 30 years of armed struggle the Eritrean peoples gained their independence, on
24 May 1991. In April 1993, in an internationally monitored referendum, 98.5% of
the registered voters voted, and of these, 99.8% voted for independence.

2.2 Location, Land, Population and Climate

Eritrea is located on the eastern part of Africa usually known as the Horn of Africa.
It is neighboured to the Red Sea on the East, the Sudan on the North and on the
Northwest, Ethiopia on the South and to Djibouti on the Southeast.

5

Eritrea Administrative Zones

Figure 1. Source: http://www.primenet.com/~ephrem/

In terms of land and population Eritrea is by far the smallest compared to Ethiopia
and the Sudan. Although the population of Eritrea is estimated to be 3.8 million, only
an estimated 2.8 million people live in the country. The remaining people live in
Diaspora as they were forced to leave their homes because of the thirty-year war for
independence. The comparison of the three countries is shown Table 1.
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Data

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Sudan

Area

124,300

1,224,000

2,505,810

Inhabitants

3.8 Million

58 Million

33 Million

47

13

Population per Sq. km 30

Table 1: Comparison of Population and Land between Eritrea, Ethiopian and Sudan. (1998)
Source: ETSS Consultant and http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/

Eritrea's terrain varies dramatically between highlands above 2,133 m
(7,000 ft) and the surrounding lowlands, which descend to sea level on the
Red Sea coast and the arid Sudan border. Eritrea is a mountainous country;
its highest point, 2,591 m (8,500 ft), is located south of Asmara, the capital.
Temperatures in the highlands range from 10 degrees C (50 degrees F) to 29
degrees C (84 degrees F) and regularly reach 38 degrees C (100 degrees F)
in the lowlands. Less than 508 mm (20 in) of rain falls annually in the
lowlands, while the highlands may receive 762-1,016 mm (30-40 in).
Eritrea is located in the easternmost part of the Sahel and experiences
periodic drought. Erosion and deforestation are serious problems.
(http://eritrea.org/EIB/control/EImain.html, 31/07/99)

2.3 Economy

Although Eritrea is one of the least developed countries, since liberation there has
been great success on the performances of the economy. Gross domestic product
(GDP) growth during 1992-1997 averaged 7.0 percent, while inflation was kept at an
average of 6.0 percent per year. The overall government fiscal deficit, including
grants, was less than 5.0 percent of GDP at the end of 1997, and the country's gross
foreign reserves increased from less than one-month of imports in 1992 to over seven
months of imports at the end of 1997. (http://eritrea.org/EIB/control/EImain.html,
31/07/99)
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Data

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

GNP (in Million Nakfa, Eritrean Currency )

3108

4407

4650

5128

5975

GNP ( in million US$ equivalents)

431.7

612.1

645.8

712.2

829.9

Table 2: The Trend of GNP in terms of Nakfa and Equivalent US$
Source: IMF staff estimates based on information provided by the Eritrean Authorities.

Some of the major factors that lead to the achievement of these successes include:
Ø Right policy: Eritrea’s economic policy is anchored upon the establishment of a
dynamic private sector-led, out-ward looking economy. The commitment is to
make the private sector the leading actor in the economic life of the country.
Ø Industrious people. The rehabilitation of the railway between Massawa and
Asmara by relying solely on local expertise and resources is a good sign of the
industriousness of the Eritrean people.
Ø Uncorrupted government. The fact that corruption is not a problem in Eritrea is
witnessed by many independent agencies. The World Bank’s good relation with
the government is one example of this case.

Agriculture is the backbone of the Eritrean economy especially as far as employment
is concerned. It accounts for about 80% of the total employment. (General
Information on Eritrean Port. P. 2). According to an article in the local newspaper Eritrea Profile- industry and distribution services are the leading sources of growth to
GDP. (Eritrea Profile, Abraham Kidane, November 1997)

Regarding transportation, domestic cargo transport of Eritrea has been largely
dependent on land transport. Inland waterways are non-existent. The railroad, which
had initially been built during the Italian rule, extending over 320 km from Massawa
to Bisha, with a planned extension to Tessenay was completely destroyed as a
consequence of the devastating thirty-year war. Massawa and Assab serve the
maritime trade of the country and of the neighbouring countries, Ethiopia and the
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Sudan. Eritrea to date has two international airports at Assab and Asmara, while the
construction of a modern international airport is underway at Massawa.

2.4 Geographical Location

Located strategically at the southern part of the Red Sea, the Port of Assab is one of
the two major ports of Eritrea. The distance from Asmara, the capital, is about 1,185
km. Since the road is not in good condition, at present there is no scheduled or
frequent land transportation between the two points. On the other hand, the distance
from Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, is 860 km and the road is in relatively good
condition. Although the port is a little bit far away from the capital and some of its
hinterlands, it is very close to one of the busiest international sea-lanes along the Red
Sea coast. Therefore, compared to the Port of Djibouti, this gives it a great
competitive advantage not only for using the port to transit cargoes to the central and
southern part of Ethiopia, but also for transhipment cargoes that pass through the two
entrances of the Red Sea.

2.5 Historical Background

Little is known about the Port of Assab before the Italian colony came to Eritrea in
1869. As a matter of fact:
The history of Assab Port is basically the history of the beginning of Italian
colonialism in Eritrea. In 1869 Italy purchased the Bay of Assab through a
shipping company and gained its first foothold in Eritrea. Assab was
formally declared an Italian colony in 1882. (Government of Eritrea Ports
and Maritime Authority, 1993,Asmara.)

During their rule, Italian colonisers constructed two berths and used the port as a
transit hub to supply and transport coal for large ships. In contrast during Great
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Britain’s protectorate administration the Port of Assab witnessed no progress.
Several of its facilities were taken and sold to neighbouring countries by the British.

As the main drive of Ethiopia to colonise Eritrea has been the possession of the
coastline, and mainly the ports of Eritrea, it started to direct substantial investments
to develop the ports. Due to geopolitical interests the investments in the Port of
Assab were so big that in 1962 the Port of Assab became a modern town and port.

From that time up to the liberation of the country (1991), investments were limited to
port equipment only. Eritrea being a young nation and starting from scratch after the
bloody thirty-year-war with Ethiopia, the longest in Africa, there is a relative
shortage of funds to finance heavy investment in new facilities and equipment.

However, the government of Eritrea, in line with the process of rebuilding the
country, is making great efforts to improve the efficiency and performance of the two
ports. To this end, several measures have been taken. The measures taken so far
include up grading the qualification of its employees, recruiting qualified personnel
and training employees domestically and abroad (in many countries such as Sweden,
Germany, and Russia). In addition, the government of Eritrea has already outlined
the short-term and long-term plans. The short-term plans are the purchase of port
equipment, construction of berth 13/14-in to a container terminal, concrete work for
container stacking and human resource development. Developing the port into a
modern transhipment port by encouraging the private sector to participate actively in
the infrastructure development through joint ventures or different forms of
concession is the long-term plan. (General Information on Eritrean Ports, 1998. P 20)

2.6 Port Administration

The administration and organisation of the ports of Eritrea, Assab and Massawa, has
been different before and after independence, except for the fact that they are
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government owned and service ports. Before independence, the Ports and Maritime
Authority (PMA) of Ethiopia was in charge of all maritime related affairs including
port services, agency services, and shipyards. However, the shipping line, although
publicly owned, was independent of PMA.

Since the liberation of the country, several changes in structure, authority and
responsibility have taken place in the maritime administration in general and in the
port administration in particular. From May 1991 up to early 1993, it was under the
direction of the Department of Ports and Marine Transport Authority, and then it
changed to Eritrean Ports Authority. Since 1995, the Department of Maritime
Transport (DMT), as the main body of government in the maritime administration, is
working under the general guidance and supervision of the Ministry of Transport and
Communications. Accordingly, the ports were given more autonomy.

The new organisation structure proposed by the management of the Port of Assab in
1997 is quite similar to the existing one (see attached figure 2) and to that of
Massawa. The only differences with the existing one being that the procurement and
property management division is put under the technical division and a marketing
division is to be added to e new one. According to the new organisation chart the
port will be supervised by a Board and the daily operations will be carried out by a
general manager. The general manager (GM) has control over staff functions for
legal questions, internal audit, planning, and port security. (ETSS, 1996, P-C/205).
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Port of Assab Organisation Chart

Board of Directors
General
Manager
Planning and
Programming

Legal

Liaison Office
(Asmara)

Internal
Auditor

Port Security

Pilot Office
Division

Pilot Unit

Operations
Division

Cargo Handling
Unit
Transport &
Equipment Unit
General Cargo and
Container Stacking
Unit

Figure 2. Source: Port of Assab

Wood Work
Shop

Finance &
Admin.
Division

Finance Unit
Administration Unit

Procurement
& Property
MGT
Division
Property Mgt
Unit
Purchase and
Stores Unit

Technical
Service
Division

Electrical
Engineering Unit
Mechanical
Engineering Unit
Civil Engineering
Unit

At present the port has a monopoly on all cargo handling, stevedoring and storage
activities. In other words, all the port services, even tug and pilotage services, are
under the control of the port administration. This means that the Port of Assab can be
categorised as a service port.

2.7 Infrastructure and Superstructure

Currently, the Port of Assab has two jetties at the commercial harbour, namely, the
North Jetty and the South Jetty. The North Jetty with a length of 495 m consists of
berth 1, berth 2 and berth 3. The South Jetty is 530 m long and comprises berth 4,
berth 5, berth 6, and berth 7. All these berths are general-purpose berths. There are
also two other special berths for Roll-on/ Roll-off ships at the tips of the two jetties,
namely berth 1A and Berth 7A.

Berth

Length

Depth

(M)

(M)

1

210

10.97

2

150

10.97

3

135

10.06

4 (formerly N0. 8)

80

5.48

5 (formerly N0. 9)

140

8.20

6 (formerly N0. 10)

160

8.84

7 (formerly N0. 11)

150

10.06

7A (formerly N0. 11a)

115

7.5

Table 3: Number of berths, their length and depth
Source: General Information on Eritrean Ports
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In addition, there are three oil berths at the oil terminal and one salt loading
terminal. Unfortunately, the salt loading terminal and berth 1A are not presently in
use. The oil berths are known as Coastal Tanker Jetty (CTJ), Refinery Jetty (RJ), and
Shell Jetty (SJ). The latter two terminals are totally operated by different
organisations and they are not referred to in this paper.
Plan of the Port of Assab

Figure 3. Source: Fair Play

Maximum and minimum draughts of the berths at the commercial harbour are 10.9m
and 5.5m, respectively. Maximum Length Over All (LOA) of a ship that can be
handled at the commercial harbour is 200m, but there is no limitation with regard to
beam. It is deemed important that all the berths are well protected from seasonal
waves by a breakwater built in front of the commercial harbour. As the tides are
negligible there is no lock. The port has two approach channels although the north
entrance is the one most frequently used.
As far as port equipment is concerned, the Port has eighteen shore cranes of 6-20
tons capacity, five mobile cranes (one with a 150 ton capacity), two tugboats, four
pilot boats, three container lift trucks, and more than one hundred forklifts and
tractors. Besides, it has bulk cargo handling equipment such as bagging machines
and vac-u-vators. Table 4 shows the number and quantity of port equipment.
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Equipment

Capacity

Quantity

Tug Boat

1400-1600 HP

3

Pilot Boat

3

Shore Crane

6-20 ton

18

Mobile Crane

6-150 ton

7

Forklifts

3-10 ton

72

Container Lift Truck

10-35 ton

4

Tug Master

4

Tractors

34

Bagging Machines

8

Table 4: Port Equipment
Source: General Information on Eritrean Ports

The port has a total storage area of about 509,498-sq. m, which can hold
approximately 370,000 tons of dry cargo at a time.

The port has 754 staff employees plus over 2000 registered skilled workers,
according to the figures of 1997.

'000 Metric Ton
YEAR

UNLOADED

LOADED

TOTAL

DRY CARGO %

1992

2,075

353

2,428

49

1993

1,919

372

2,291

46

1994

2,310

505

2,815

46

1995

2,443

484

2,927

48

1996

2,421

562

2923

54

1997

1,836

476

2,312

44

Table 5: Cargo Traffic through the Port of Assab
Source: General Information on Eritrean Ports
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2.8 Productivity and Performance Indicators of the Port of Assab

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to measure effectively the operational efficiency
of a port using a single measurement. Instead, one has to use a series of different
measures, which are known as port performance indicators. According to UNCTAD,
there are four commonly used groups of performance indicators for cargo handling,
namely:

1.

Indicators of Output

2.

Indicators of Service

3.

Indicators of Utilisation

4.

Indicators of Productivity (UNCTAD, IPP1, 1982. P 6)

The following paragraphs present these four groups of performance indicators with
regard to the Port of Assab.
2.8.1 Indicators of Output
Generally, there are three essential types of output indicators for ports: berth
throughput, ship output, and gang output. The berth throughput measures the total
tonnage of cargo handled at a berth in a stated period – usually a year.

The port of Assab handled about 1.4 million tons of dry cargo, about 1.6 tons of oil
and 676 vessels in 1996. The dry cargo traffic comprises break-bulk cargo,
containers, bulk cargo, and vehicles. In recent years, containerisation has been
increasing rapidly in the Port of Assab. It has grown from just 5% of the total dry
cargo in 1992 to 30% in 1997.
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YEAR

TOTAL FULL

TOTAL DRY CARGO

CONTAINERS HANDLED

HANDLED (M/tons)

%

(M/tons)

1992

52,855

1,176,116

4

1993

94,896

1,045,984

9

1994

135,037

1,279,979

11

1995

182,425

1,399,665

13

1996

292,603

1,331,080

22

1997

298,736

1,005,952

30

Table 6: Ratio of Containerised Cargo to Total Dry Cargo
Source: Port of Assab, Stasistcal Bulletin

The second measure of output is the ship output. It measures the rate at which cargo
is handled to and from a vessel at a berth. There are several ways to measure this
indicator, but the common ones are tonnes per ship working hours, tonnes per ship
hours at berth, and tonnes per ship hours in port. To calculate these indicators, one
has to divide the ship’s total tonnage by the ship’s worked hours, ship’s hours at
berth, and ship’s hours in a port, respectively. The average ship output of break bulk
cargo per ship worked hours at the Port of Assab is about 32 t per hour. The average
output per ship hours at berth is 23 t per hour, and the average output per ship hours
in the port is 18 t per hour. The average number of gangs per ship per shift is 2.2.

The last indicator of output is the gang output. This is the average tonnage of cargo
handled by one gang per hour. The gang output can be calculated in several ways:
Gang output per ship per shift

= Total tonnes handled by gang in a shift
Shift hours

Or Gang output per ship

= Total tonnes handled in a ship
Total gang hours worked in the ship
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The average gang output of general cargo for the Port of Assab based on the data of
1997 is about 18 tonnes. This does not include containerised cargo and vehicles
because the handling rates for these types of cargoes are so high due to their nature
that it will overstate the gang output.
2.8.2 Indicators of Utilisation
As the name implies indicators of utilisation measure the extent facilities and
resources are used. UNCTAD suggests two major indicators of berth utilisation;
namely, berth occupancy and berth working time. Berth occupancy may be
calculated by:
= Hours (days) berth is occupied
X 100
Total Possible hours (days) in a Period

As shown in table 7, the average figure of berth occupancy for the Port of Assab
fluctuated between 45.3 and 62.9 in the years 1992 to 1997. The figures are by far
below the maximum occupancy ratios provided by UNCTAD. (B.L Francou,
Performance Indicators, 1999, P 26.). The main reason for this problem is the
application of very high possible hours by simply assuming the port is open 24 hours
365 days a year.

Year

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Berth

Occupancy 60.6

53.6

62.9

58.0

54.8

45.3

Number of Ship calls 262

314

384

429

491

473

14%

33%

22%

25%

17%

Ratios

(only Dry Cargo)
Waiting Time

39%

Table 7: Berth Occupancy Ratios for the Port of Assab
Source: The Port of Assab
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The second major utilisation indicator is berth-working time. This is defined as the
period of time that a ship is at berth and labour is scheduled to work. In other words,
ship's time at berth minus non-operational time gives berth-working time. One has to
deduct idle time to arrive at the operational time of a ship.

There are no reliable statistics on berth working time in the port of Assab. The
already existing data suggest a very high berth working time, which is more than
90% of berth time. The main reasons for this limitation could be the method of
recording data. First, non-operational time is recorded with respect to labour rather
than to each ship. Secondly, since there is no official meal break, it is assumed that
the whole shift time is an operational time unless work is interrupted by bad weather
conditions. Even shift changeover delays are not recorded. There fore, it is difficult,
if not unrealistic, to give a sound conclusion how the berth has been utilised based on
the available data.
2.8.3 Indicators of Service
Nowadays, the customer is placing more and more emphasis on the quality of service
provided than tariff or other elements of costs. This is largely because the level and
quality of service provided affects costs and thus profits of the customer directly or
indirectly. Therefore, it is essential a port knows and evaluates its quality of service.

There are many indicators that can be used to measure the quality of service a port
provides for its users (shippers, importers, and ship owners). However, the most
commonly used indicator, and the only one that will be considered in this case, is
ship turn round time: the total time spent by a particular vessel in a port.

The ship turn round time can vary depending on many factors: ships’ particulars such
as size, and type, and speed of service being provided to ship operators. The larger
the vessel, the longer the ship-turn round time tends to be. Similarly, a general cargo
vessel with many small consignments and different packaging requires a longer
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services time and thus longer turn round time compared to a Ro/Ro vessel with only
one type of cargo, mainly vehicles.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the faster the service provided to the ship
operator, the shorter the ship turn round time will be. Therefore, it is more logical to
present the average turn round time of each type of ship.

Table 8 depicts the average turn round time for each type of ship type based on the
statistical data of 1997.

Ship Type

Bagged

Lash

Bulk

Container General

Ro/Ro

cargo
Average

Turn 173

11

380

34

98

89

Round Time (hours)
Table 8: Average Turn round time of ships in the Port of Assab
Source: Port of Assab

2.8.4 Indicators of Productivity
The final category of indicators concerns the indicators of productivity. They show
the efficiency of berth operation. The cost per tonne of cargo handled is a useful
measure of efficiency in cargo handling operations. In order to arrive at the cost per
tonne value, the costs incurred for cargo handled must be available.

There are many ways of categorising port costs, but in general they can be
categorised in to fixed and variable costs. As their name implies the variable costs
vary with respect to variation in output, but the fixed component does not vary with
respect to output. The fixed costs are also referred to as overhead costs.

Using 1997 data of 157 vessels, the cost per tonne or the productivity for the port of
Assab has been roughly found as provided in table 9.
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Cargo Type

Productivity

Bagged

1,62

Bulk

2,29

Container

23,92

General Cargo

3,47

Ro/Ro

9,46

Table 9: Productivity of the Port of Assab
Source: Port of Assab
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III. The Role of the Port of Assab to the National Economy

Generally, the transport system of goods by sea consists of three essential
components. The first refers to the movement of goods by land from farm or factory
gates. Secondly, there is the merchant fleet, which consists of the marine vehicles
that move the goods from the loading and discharging ports. Finally, there is the port
acting as the crucial interface between the land and the sea. This is the primary role
of ports in the world.

However, depending on their size and circumstances, ports have much greater roles
to play, either to the national economy only, or to both the national and regional
economies. Among the other main contributions of ports are employment creation,
income generation (value added), and trade promotion. This chapter explains the role
of the Port of Assab briefly.

The main objective, however, is to emphasise that the role of the port can be
enhanced if its problems of productivity and performance are solved. It is hoped that
by identifying the main problems of productivity and performance of the port and
providing recommendations to solve them, this dissertation could contribute to
materialise the port's role and/or increase it.

Depending on the hinterland they serve, ports can generally be categorised as local,
regional, or national. Since the Port of Assab used to serve predominantly (more than
90%) transit cargo from and to Ethiopia, it can be categorised as a regional port (see
figure 4 for hinterland map of the port). However, at the present time due to the
unfortunate border conflict between the two countries, Ethiopia and Eritrea, the
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former has diverted its seaborne trade to the neighbouring Port of Djibouti.
Consequently, the impact of the port after the conflict has diminished simply because
domestic traffic is very limited. Whether Ethiopia is going to use the Port of Assab in
the near future or not is difficult to foresee. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning at
this point that for convenience purposes the analysis of the impact of the port is
based on the situation and facts that existed before the conflict. In addition, all
statistics reflect the situation since independence.
The Potential and Actual Hinterland of the Port of Assab

Assab

Figure 4. Source: http://www.comesa.int/
Keys:

The roads linking Addis Ababa with the Ports of Djibouti and Assab
Potential and Actual Hinterland
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This chapter has three main parts. The first part deals with the direct, indirect and
induced employment impacts. In the second part, an attempt is made to find out the
value-added impact of the port to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In this part the
difficulties faced to get that information are also explained. Finally, other
quantitative and qualitative impacts, not only to the national economy, but also to
neighbouring Ethiopia as the main user of the port, will be discussed.

3.1 Source of Employment
3.1.1 Direct Impact
In the past, owing to the absence or very low competition among ports around the
world and public ownership of them, the main objective of ports used to be the
creation of employment. Nowadays the situation has changed. Competition has
become more and more fierce and private companies have started to run and own
ports. This has necessitated a very close control of costs. One way of controlling
costs is to utilise the right combination of the factors of production, which in most
cases has been to use more capital and less labour. In any case, ports remain to be
great sources of employment.

Similarly, the Port of Assab has been a great source of employment, both to Eritreans
and Ethiopians alike, thanks to the labour intensive method of providing services and
the labour demanding nature of break bulk cargo. The employment levels in
industries that are directly related to the port could be presented as follows:
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Port Administration Employees (includes all cargo handling, pilotage, tugging,
mooring/ unmooring, port security, infrastructure maintenance and administrative
staff) All contract, casual, and permanent employees.

3100

Shipping Agencies (Only Eritrean Shipping Transit and Agency Service), (Maritime and
Transit Service of Ethiopia, and Ethiopian Shipping Line not included)
Ship chandlers and other ship - related services (personal estimate)

200

Forwarding Agents

>100

Control: Customs, Health and Immigration

>50

Refinery (approximately)

800

Total

40

>4290

Table 10: Direct Employment Impact of the Port of Assab
Source: Port of Assab and Author's observation.

3.1.2 Indirect Impact
The indirect impacts', according to the port impact lecture notes, 'are the
effects of the firms or organisations that have decided to settle themselves
around the port, or inside the port area, and even a little farther from the
port, because they need it for their activities; the port has been the
determinant factor for their location. (Francou, B 1999. P. 9.)

The only firms or organisations that can be presented here as examples are the
Fishery and the Salt industries. These are considered as an indirect impact of the port
because they obviously decided to settle around the port for the reason that they
needed some port services in carrying out their activities. Specifically, while the
Assab Salt Factory makes use of pilot services for exporting salt by ships, the fishery
industry will utilise the cold storage of the port as soon as it starts exporting fish.
Although there is no accurate data, these firms certainly absorb a considerable
amount of employment. There are more than 300 workers in the Assab Salt Factory
working on a daily or permanent basis. Roughly, about 50 people are working under
the Ministry of Fisheries in the Assab branch. Besides, a new fishing infrastructure
built to promote fish export was in the implementation stage in 1997. The mere
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construction of this project created considerable employment in the city. Therefore, it
is evident that the port is creating a substantial level of indirect employment.
3.1.3 Induced Impact
Finding the accurate amount of induced impact of ports seems a common problem in
almost all ports in the world. It requires extensive investigation and thus considerable
resources. Case studies conducted in Le Havre, Rotterdam and other ports to find out
their impact are the prime examples in this case. A simple approach is adopted to
provide a rough estimate of induced impact of the Port of Assab, which is based on
certain facts, as follows:
Ø There are no major industrial or trade activities in the port city of Assab apart
from the port and related activities. In other words, the city almost entirely
depends on the port, fishery, refinery, and the salt factory.
Ø The population of the city of Assab has fallen dramatically to almost 50% of its
pre-conflict figure, according to some people's opinion. Most of those who left
the port are Ethiopians who became jobless due to the substantial decline in
traffic.

Based on these facts, one can infer that for every one job created in industries which
are directly or indirectly linked to the port, at least three additional jobs were created
in the form of induced impact. The population of the port city of Assab was around
60,000 of which about 5,000 people were directly or indirectly employed in the port
and related activities. If the families who depend on them, the income they spend on
food, clothing, and other necessities for themselves and their families are taken into
account, the induced impact on employment will be even higher.
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3.2 Value Added as a Percentage of GDP

Indeed, it is very difficult to give an exact picture of the impact the of Port of Assab
on the economy in value added terms for one basic reason - the difficulty of
obtaining data. As it is very well known, Eritrea has emerged from a devastating
thirty-year war. Consequently, all the economic sectors of the country have been
gravely affected by the war and everything had to start from zero. Due to this fact,
the method used to calculate the Value Added impact of the Port of Assab is quite
unconventional.

The figures collected from different sources are combined together to arrive at closer
to reality value added impact of the port. The Ministry of Finance provided the GDP
of the country. The income of the port is obtained from the annual report prepared by
the port administration. According to the 1997 figures the contribution of the Port of
Assab in value added terms to GDP equals 2.3%. The value added takes into account
only the income generated from port activities: cargo handling, wharfage, receipt/
delivery operation, equipment hire, registration and licence, and shipping service
(pilotage, mooring/unmooring,). Thus, the other related firms and organisation are
omitted due to the difficulty in getting data.

To sum up, the employment impact of the port of Assab locally is substantial. In fact,
since the port is a regional one, it has an impact on neighbouring Ethiopia as well.
Thanks to the duplication of shipping and forwarding agency activities, the same or
may be even higher number of people are employed in Ethiopia to perform the same
tasks. However, the latter impact is not mentioned in the foregoing section primarily
because there is little, or no, difference when Ethiopia diverted its seaborne trade
from the Port of Assab to the Port of Djibouti.

27

3.3 Other Quantitative and Qualitative Impacts
The generation of hard currency to the national economy from port dues is another
contribution of the port. Eritrea, like all other developing countries, greatly needs
hard currency, although not all revenue or port dues were collected in terms of hard
currency. Pursuant to the agreements reached between the two countries'
governments, vessels flying the Ethiopian flag were permitted to pay their port dues
in Birr, the Ethiopian currency. Thus, despite the great need for hard currency, the
source was limited only to port dues from ships of a foreign flag other than
Ethiopian. This is good for the latter because it is relieved of considerable hard
currency spending on port services. It also implies that the Port has played a great
role to promote Ethiopian seaborne trade.

Not only from the exemption of hard currency did the Ethiopian economy and
seaborne trade benefit, but also from the reduced port tariffs and increased efficiency
of port services (as compared to the past when Ethiopia had direct possession of the
port). In addition, Ethiopia used to have freedom to use the port for its seaborne
trade. All imports and export transit cargoes were free of any customs duty.
Ethiopian customs authorities were allowed to check their cargoes for customs
purposes inside the port although the border is more than 70 km far away from the
port. This had some contributions to increase the in-transit-time of transit cargo and
hinder cargo-handling operations. Despite these difficulties, it is worth mentioning
here that the cargo traffic that passed through the port of Assab has increased
considerably from 1992-1996 by 20% per annum. This is because the port of Assab
has been more efficient than the neighbouring Port of Djibouti, especially as far as
bulk and conventional general cargo is concerned. Although statistical data can not
be presented to support this argument, ship owners always witness that the turnround time in the Port of Assab is shorter than that of Djibouti.
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The equitable distribution of economic activities and wealth achieved could be
considered as an example of qualitative benefit that the port of Assab contributes to
the country. In the author's opinion, growth in this part of the country would be much
lower than the present had the port not existed. In other words, the port is
contributing to the balanced growth strategy of the regions within the country.

Furthermore, it would be interesting to mention that the Port of Assab administration
planted all the trees in the city of Assab. This is another important contribution to the
environment and also gives the port good reputation. Thanks to the efforts that have
been made by the port administration, the Port of Assab is also known as 'The Green
Harbour.'
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IV. Major Problems of Productivity and performance of the Port of Assab

Many factors contribute to a port’s poor performance and productivity. Broadly, they
can be grouped into two: institutional and external factors. The institutional factors
are those that originate from within the organisation itself. These problems are
relatively easy to solve by better management of internal resources. As the name
implies, the external problems are those that are caused by external actors in the port
with the exception of the Port Authority. In these are included: customs office,
trucking companies, freight forwarders, shipping agents, immigration authority,
shippers and ship owners. Poor port performance and productivity arising from
inefficiencies of these actors is difficult to be solved by the port unless they are ready
to implement the recommendations forwarded by the port authority, or they take
initiative by themselves.

This is one main reason for this paper to deal with the institutional causes of poor
port performance and productivity. Even all the institutional factors are not analysed
exhaustively because of insufficient time and other resources, particularly
unavailability of relevant data. So, the analysis of the difficulties for the productivity
and performance of the Port of Assab in this chapter is limited to those, which are
considered as the major problems.

4.1 Shortage of Know-how and skilled labour

In general, in order to provide services or to produce products, three basic
ingredients - labour, capital and land - are needed. In economics these are called
production factors. Of these three factors, labour is the most important. There can
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never be any growth or development without the contribution of labour. People
create machines (capital), but machines do not create people. Of course, using more
automation can reduce the level of people involved in providing services or products
but still skilled labour is needed to operate and manage these machines.

Not just to labour intensive ports, such as the Port of Assab, but also to the most
automated and capital intensive ones is skilled labour important. For example, the
most automated terminal in the world today, (the ECT - European Combined delta
Terminal - in the port of Rotterdam), is not completely unmanned. There are
engineers who program the automatic machines. Undoubtedly, automation can result
in great savings in the level of labour involved in production and not a complete
absence. Also, the kind of labour may be different in the sense that the company uses
few, highly paid, and very highly skilled people instead of many, less skilled or
unskilled, and low paid labour.

Given the rapid growth in technology in all industries in general, and in shipping in
particular, the need for skills and know-how has increased tremendously. Ports need
skilled people to operate and manage equipment that is fast increasing in
sophistication, and to a certain extent, increasing in cost. For example, ports need
skilled and well-trained people to operate modern, very expensive gantry cranes.
Nowadays, most port equipment requires special skills and know-how that can only
be acquired by giving training and/or recruiting competent people. As discussed in
IPP3:

Many of the worst features of port can be ascribed not to lack of equipment
or of financial resources but to poor performance of labour force and
management. (UNCTAD, IPP3, 1990. P 141)

Since skilled labour is increasingly becoming important for the survival and growth
of today's ports, it might be necessary to look at the level of skill and know-how in
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the port of Asssab. This is approached in two ways. First, by analysing the statistical
data available and second by applying the author's observation.

It seems logical to start with the investigation of age composition. In the year ending
December 1998, the average age of the total permanent employees of the Port of
Assab was 36 years. As can be seen from figure 5, 18% of the total employees are
older than 46. Female employees constitute only 9% of the total employees About 44
percent of the employees are below 32 years old. The range for all employees
(including the contractual workers) at that time was 20 to 65. According to the
Eritrean provisional labour law the retirement age is 55. Thus, those who are at
retirement age work on a contractual basis.

Port of Assab Age Distribution of Employees (1998)

7%

7%

11%

18 - 24
25 - 31
32 - 38

14%

37%

39 - 45
46 - 52
Above 52

24%

Figure 5. Source: The Port of Assab

The next point to be made is the assessment of skills and know-how. The port almost
entirely serves foreign vessels and cargo. The international nature of the activity and
the

ever-increasing

competition

with

neighbouring

ports

demand

sound

entrepreneurship detailed knowledge of the port industry and maritime regulations.
This being the key factor to survive and continue in the prevailing competition, the
labour force both at management and non-management level lacks the required basic
and specialist skills. The educational status of existing employees indicates that out
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of the total staff 0.5 % are illiterate, 7.5% can only read and write, while about 40%
are below 12th grade. Just 2.5% of the staff have vocational/technical education while
the diploma and degree graduates constitute only 4.5%. The port had recruited over
50 technically skilled people in the years before 1995, but most of them resigned
after acquiring enough experience due to dissatisfaction of salary. So, on the one
hand the port loses experienced workers, and on the other hand, it is forced to keep
many lesser skilled workers with a relatively low morale.

Port of Assab Education Status of Employees (1998)
4%
3%

1%

8%

Illiterate

3%

Read & Write
Elementary
Education
Junior Education

24%
Secondary
Education
Technical Education
Diploma
Degree & Above

45%

15%

Figure 6. Source: The Port of Assab

As far as training is concerned, although it has been given to port employees, it was
not sufficient and continuous for several reasons. The major reason is shortage of
trainers not only in the Port Administration but also in that region of the countryknown as zone ‘Debubawi Key Bahri’. Almost all graduates come from the central
highlands and resettle in this region. Despite the fact that Eritrea possesses more than
1200 km of seacoast, most of the Eritrean population is concentrated in the
highlands, a little bit far away from the southern coastlines. Consequently, most of
the people's knowledge about the sea is limited and they consider working in the
maritime field as the riskiest kind of employment. The implication of this is that
there is a supply constraint.
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When assessing the skill and know-how, it is not just the level of education and
training that matters but also profession, and the relevance of education and training.
There is a critical and acute shortage in marine engineering and nautical fields in the
Maritime Administration in general and in the port administration in particular.
There are very few seafarers in the country, but they prefer to go to sea because they
can earn much more money from sailing than from working in the ports.

Another reason that caused the shortage of skill and which specifically refers to the
lack of trained people is a historical fact. For example, several people have been
trained at World Maritime University (WMU) before independence, but none of
these were Eritrean. Although currently five Eritreans are studying at WMU, besides
being the first batch since independence, none of them has had any nautical or
marine engineering background.

4.2 Lack of Financial Resources

Generally, people agree that the bottom line of any organisation is to make a profit.
The main question is how to get this profit? It is beyond the scope of this paper to go
into deep analysis of the financial situation of the port. Nevertheless, the general
financial position and the areas where shortage of money is reflected will be
highlighted.

In the year of 1997 the port received revenues of 163,218,000 Birr, Ethiopian
currency, which is equivalent to US$ 22,669,000 (exchange rate is 1 US$ = 7.2 Birr).
Details are shown in table 11. The main source of income was cargo-handling
charges, which, together with storage charges, accounts for 72 percent of the total.

Costs in that year were only 54,274,000 Birr. This figure is equivalent to 38% of
revenues. One of the reasons for lower costs in relation to revenues is attributed to
very low provision of depreciation costs, plus a low level of reinvestment.
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Depreciation takes the historical cost of assets instead of market value or
replacement values. Consequently, the highest cost incurred was on "wages and
salaries" which accounted for 53 % of the total. The second largest costs, materials
and supplies, accounted for 20 % of the total costs.
ACCOUNT TITTLE

AMOUNT IN BIRR

TOTAL REVENUE:

163,218,000

TOTAL EXPENSES:

54,274,000
108,944,000

PROFIT BEFORE INTEREST
AND TAX
Table 11 Revenue and Expense Statement 1997
Source: Port of Assab

Looking at the profit, the port made 108,944,000 Birr profit before interest and tax,
equivalent to 67 % of total revenues. The port appears to be profitable and
financially self-sufficient, but here many points have to be taken into account.

Firstly, at present the port is not burdened with loans, and therefore has no interest
payments.
Secondly, the Port of Assab, as well as the Port of Massawa, do not pay income tax,
but their profits are passed on to the Ministry of Finance and their foreign exchange
is transferred to the Central Bank. The port does not have its own foreign exchange
account, but it is allowed to use as much hard currency as it needs from the national
treasury for importing spare parts and other necessary inputs.

Thirdly, the depreciation method is not appropriate. It neither takes the replacement
value nor the economic life of the equipment into consideration. The straight-line
method of depreciation is the one that is used to depreciate assets. Although this is
determined by the law that is passed by the Ministry of Finance of the State of
Eritrea, attempts could be made to convince the Ministry to apply dynamic and
appropriate depreciation methods to reflect the real financial statements of the port.
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Finally, tariffs are stated in dollars, and are also paid in dollars with the exception of
tariffs charged to Eritrean and Ethiopian shipping lines, which are allowed to pay in
Birr. However, there were increases in profits due to the fact that charges for some of
these services increased in terms of Birr (because they were kept relatively constant
in terms of dollars) when the tariffs were last revised in 1995.
Recent trends reveal that revenues increased by 41% p.a. between 1992-1997 in
terms of Birr. The main reason was increases in revenues from cargo handling,
storage, shipping, and equipment hire. The revenues from these services increased
mainly because the volume of cargo went up, but partly, as explained above, charges
for some of these services increased in terms of Birr.
On the other hand, costs have increased by slightly less than the revenues in the same
period. Wage costs increased as the wage bill for casual workers increased along
with the cargo levels, which went up by 20% per annum (see page 25-chapter III).
The combination of rising revenues and slightly less increase in costs has resulted in
increasing profits by the same percentage points as revenues, see figure 7.
Port of Assab Revenues and Expences Trend
250,000
Revenues

200,000
Expenses

150,000
Income Before
Interest and Tax
100,000
Linear (Revenues )

50,000
Linear (Expenses)

0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Year

Figure 7. Source: Port of Assab
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Linear (Income
Before Interest and
Tax)

The shortage of money can be looked at from two viewpoints. The first one is the
organisation's inability to send as many people as desired for training abroad. It just
can not afford it.

The second viewpoint is the difficulty to replace the old and outdated equipment.
Empirical studies indicate that many of the (equipment) management difficulties
experienced in the ports of developing countries arise from a shortage of funds,
particularly of foreign exchange for the purchase of new equipment and vital
supplies, and from rigid government constraints on overseas purchases. Unlike in
some ports where the major cause of their inability to finance such purchases
themselves is due to the governments’ prevention to review and, where appropriate,
raise their tariffs to provide sufficient revenues, the Ports of Eritrea enjoy little
control on tariffs. They are free to change their tariffs as long as it is commercially
justifiable.

The problem of port equipment and facilities in the Eritrean Ports has been
thoroughly studied by the Eritrean Port Rehabilitation Project Unit (EPRP) with the
close collaboration of the World Bank. The studies have recommended the purchase
of some equipment for both ports and rehabilitation of the Port of Massawa, the
second major port of Eritrea. Some of the problems of equipment in the Port of
Assab are explained briefly below in order to give a picture.
It can be seen from the service years of equipment in table 12 that 19% of the
equipment has served below 5 years, 22% 5-10 years, 13% 10-15 years and 46%
above 15 years. Due to this reason the cargo handling activities are suffering from
the wear and tear of equipment. It should be noted here that the service years are
counted until the year of 1997 only.
Fifty-seven agricultural tractors serve shore-handling operations. Twenty-eight were
acquired in 1993, while eleven of them are in service for over 15 years. The speed of
the tractors is extremely low especially when compared with modern alternative
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equipment. This illustrates besides their old age, that they are obsolete and
inappropriate for port activities, thus possibly reducing output while increasing
operating costs.
The maximum heavy lift capacity is limited to about 50 tons. Even if there is one
mobile crane with an original capacity of 150 tons, mainly serving ship to shore
handling, it is downrated to 50 tons due to long service years. This particular
equipment was acquired in 1976. The rest of the mobile cranes are capable of
working on shore activity only and none of them has less than ten years of service.
This leaves the port dependent on one mobile crane for the handling of containers
and heavy lifts for ship to shore activities.
The wear and tear on port equipment is the most serious as far as forklift trucks is
concerned. Almost 67% of the seventy-two forklifts have had more than 15 years of
service while only 4.2% of them were acquired five years ago.
Service Years

Below 5 years

5-10 years

10-15 years

Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent

Total

Percent

Number

23.6

48

66.7

72

11

19.3

57

0.0

4

42.9

7

0.0

4

Forklifts (3-15t)

3

4.2

4

5.6

Tractors

28

49.1

18

31.6

0.0

Tugmasters

0

0.0

4

100.0

0.0

Mobile cranes
(6-150t)
Container Lift
Trucks (25-75t)
Shore cranes
(6-20t)
Tugboats

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

0

0.0

Pilot boats

0

Bagging
Machines
Total

3

17

Above 15 years
Number

0.0

4

57.1

75.0

1

25.0

3

0.0

0.0

18

100.0

18

1

50.0

0.0

1

50.0

2

0.0

1

25.0

25.0

2

50.0

4

4

33.3

8

66.7

0.0

12

35

19.4

39

21.7

46.1

180

19.4

21.7

1

0.0
23

12.8

12.8

Table 12: Port of Assab Port Equipment Service Years Annual Report 1997
Source: The Port of Assab
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83

46.1

100

Finally, the shore cranes are hardly the cause of low productivity despite the fact that
they are older than 15 years. They are, by technical standard and practical usage in
the Port of Assab, capable of serving longer than the other port equipment. In
general, they can serve up to 25 years or more; of course, preventive maintenance
and major overhauls are required.
TYPE OF

CAPACITY

EQUIPMENT

MOBILE CRANE

Down Time
HRS

15 Ton
150 Ton

1,056.00
472.00

AVAILABILITY

% FROM MPH

HRS

% FROM MPH

UTILISATION
HRS

% FROM
AVAILABILITY

12.1

7,704.00

87.9

860.8

11.2

5.4

8,288.00

94.6

1109.2

13.4

25 Ton

1,304.00

14.9

7,456.00

85.1

1531.6

20.5

45 Ton

4,448.00

50.8

4,312.00

49.2

191.6

4.4

CONTAINER
LIFT
TRUCK

25 Ton

2072

23.7

6688

76.3

261

3.9

35 Ton

10312

39.2

15968

60.8

3,081

19.3

FORKLIFTS

10 Ton

7624

43.5

9896

56.5

2,356

23.8

3 Ton

24378

34.8

45702

65.2

7,420

16.2

4 Ton

57906

33.1

117294

66.9

19,158

16.3

6 Ton

38752

63.2

22568

36.8

4,312

19.1

60 HP

91466

37.3

153814

62.7

48,751

31.7

65 HP

154192

80.0

38528

20.0

8,027

20.8

76 HP

38816

88.6

4984

11.4

1,412

28.3

20 Ton

3235

9.6

30345

90.4

6,155

20.3

6.3 Ton

8424

7.2

109106

92.8

19,379

17.8

40 Ton

7279.7

27.7

19000.3

72.3

5,165

27.2

TRACTOR

SHORE CRANE

TUG MASTER

NB: MPH= Maximum Possible Hours - For Shore Crane is 23 Hours Per Day

Table 13: Port Equipment Availability and Performance Follow up Annual Report of 1998
Source: The Port of Assab

The other point that should be investigated on the problem of port equipment is the
status of equipment. As can be seen from table 13, the 25t and 6t mobile cranes, the
4t and 6t forklift trucks, and the 65hp and 76hp tractors have been inaccessible for
quite a considerable time. These are most in demand because of the nature of the
traffic. They are flexible operationally. The mobile cranes are used for full containers
and for conventional cargo. The forklifts are employed for lifting empty containers,
and palletised and other conventional cargo.
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The performance of equipment is another issue to be dealt with. Again, referring to
table 13, it is evident that shore cranes have the highest availability next to the 150t
mobile crane, but their utilisation is too low. The reason for low utilisation is mainly
due to low demand and low traffic in that year.

Normally, the older the equipment the lower the performance and the higher the
operation cost. Due to the hot and humid climate of the Port of Assab, the wear and
tear of equipment is accelerated which in turn results in high break down and, of
course, higher maintenance cost. The breakdown of shore and quay handling
equipment caused the highest idle time at berth in 1996 (see table 14). It has been
steadily increasing throughout the years between 1992-1997. The causes of
breakdown are age of equipment and continuous deployment of equipment during
peak demand. That means preventive maintenance and routine overhauls are bound
to be postponed, which further deteriorates the piece of equipment.
Year

Code of
idle time
cause*
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

SHIP
SHIP
MOVEME PREPARA
NT
TION

01 , 08 37 02,03,04,06
, 07,09,10
173.5
196.5
255
328.75
341.25

102.5
100
5.75
17.25
235.25

GOODS

11,15

267.5
198.5
30
48.75
181.75

LABOUR

SHIP
SHORE METEOR CUSTOM, MISCL.
PORT
TRANSP OLOGY HEALTH,
EQUIPME
ORT
SHIP
NT
AGENT,
BREAK
IMMIGRA
DOWN
TION
12, 13, 22, 05,14,21,25 16,17, 18
27
19,20,32 28,29,30,
23, 24, 31,
,26
35, 36, 38,
33, 34
99
845.5
493.5
192.25
183.5
4.5
100
724.75
600.5
410
39.75
2.75
105.75
854.25
298.75
462.75
51.25
137
822
714.5
188.5
59.75
4.75
248.75
1172.5
1239.25
154.75
247
19
517.5

Table 14 Port of Assab Summarised Gang Idle Time for Dry cargo Vessels (hours/year) 19911996.
Source: Port of Assab
* The codes are the same as in UNCTAD Hand Book on Uniform Port Statistics, 198x

This clearly indicates that the condition of equipment is getting worse. The
maintenance policy of the Port of Assab is mainly preventive maintenance, but, of
course, equipment is repaired when a breakdown occurs. The hot and humid climate
of the place necessitates preventive maintenance to be one option of a maintenance
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TOTAL

2362.75
2378.5
2094.75
2433
4108.25

policy, but corrective maintenance should be done as well. This leads to a high
maintenance cost of the equipment.

To sum up, analysing the cost of equipment is not the main objective of this research.
The objective is rather to show that although the lack of necessary equipment is
affecting the productivity and performance of the port, the real cause is lack of
finance to take measures. More specifically, there is a lack of financial resources to
purchase new equipment.

4.3 Planning and General Management Related Problems
4.3.1 Deficiency in Management Information System
It is a general consensus that information is power. So, one without information is
powerless. Information is necessary for doing planning. It is also essential for the
success of an organisation in today's highly competitive ports.

The significance of information for all types of planning in general, and for
equipment planning in particular, is well understood. The effectiveness and
efficiency of planning greatly depends on the availability and use of relevant,
accurate and comprehensive information. There are very good examples in the IPP3
handbook concerning port equipment policy, management and maintenance. One is
on equipment planning:

Equipment planning is virtually impossible with out traffic forecast,
operational indicators, assets register data, maintenance records and cost
information. Procurement is the other examples. In procurement, technical
specification has to be based on analysis of past and current data on
operating performance and maintenance history, as well as on suppliers and
their past performance-not to mention the process of life cycle costing,
which is utterly reliant on comprehensive information. Effective
maintenance management requires a wide range of record types for all
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aspects of planning and costing. Supplies management can only be
performed efficiently and organised appropriately if it is based on a good
record system for stock control and procurement. In operations the vital
business of cost control revolves around operation records. In other sections
of the port, personnel records, salaries and bonuses, as well as staff
appraisal, training and manpower development all depend on information.
(UNCTAD, IPP3, 1990. P 166)

An accurate inventory of equipment is essential for operational and investment
planning. In this respect the Port of Assab has some deficiencies. First of all, there is
some inconsistency on the information concerning the equipment inventory. For
example, the number of fork lift trucks available in "General Information on Eritrean
Ports, 1998" is higher than that in the Assab port Annual Report, 1997, in spite of the
fact that no equipment was added through purchase or otherwise. Secondly, the way
of recording machine hours is not quite reliable because it is based on the
‘Requisition Form’ rather than on the readings of an hour-machine.

Not only accuracy, relevance, and comprehensiveness of information but also its
systematic collection, compilation, analysis and presentation are important. In other
words, the existence of a sound management information system (MIS) for effective
and efficient port planning including operation planning is vital.

The essential elements of MIS include:

• A system: a formalised sequence of activities and records, available to all who
need it when they need it, and in a convenient, easily managed and maintained
form;

• A database: which contains all the required information, accurately recorded and
updated, analysed and presented in a usable and easily comprehended form;
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• A management tool: an indispensable instrument in the decision-making process.
As part of a sound MIS, data should only be collected for a purpose, not simply
because they might be useful. When the purpose has been defined, the form and
quantity of data can be decided and the system for its collection, summary and
storage organised.

M. Dounts, in the Manual on Port Management, Part Two (1976), distinguishes two
ways of data collection: in-house and external. He further subdivides the in-house
data collection system in to three basic ways; namely, continuous recording,
sampling, and one-off collection. In continuous recording, data are collected as
events take place and are stored for latter use or summarised in regular reports. With
sampling, data are collected intermittently or for a certain proportion of all events.
With one-off collection, data required for a specific purpose are collected in purpose
designed exercise. These methods are not necessarily simple alternatives.

The Port of Assab mainly applies continuous recording, but some times data are
collected on a one-off base for specific purposes, such as tariff revision. This, of
course, has cost implications. Nevertheless, since data are being prepared in
operations, finance and administration, and technical divisions and sent on to the
planning and statistics unit in order to be retained for planning purposes, consistency
of data collection is controlled and the availability ensured when the data are
required.

The second way of data collection is the systematic collection of external data from
outside organisations such as new projects and the press. This way of data collection
is not sufficiently exploited by the Port of Assab. This might not affect the
productivity and performance of the port directly but it can affect it indirectly. For
example, information about new methods of handling cargo may be available in
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certain international press. If the port does not follow such information, it will have a
disadvantage as compared to competitors who manage to get such data.

Great efforts have been made to control and measure the administrative and
operational costs of the Port of Assab. Before independence the operating and
running costs of most of the equipment was hardly controlled. However, that is not
sufficient to ensure the efficiency of the port. More efforts should be exercised to
analyse costs. Management should be provided with ready-made information on
costs to make decisions. For example, information about the economic life of
equipment is essential to decide the replacement of that particular equipment. The
full control and analysis of the port costs in general, and equipment costs in
particular, can not be realised due, amongst other things, to the deficiency in MIS.

One of the main reasons that enabled the port of Aarhus, Denmark, to be the most
productive port in Europe, is that it employs a sound MIS not only within the port's
different sections but also with relation to all port users and relevant authorities. The
port users and relevant authorities include transport buyers, local liner agents,
transport providers, forwarders and trucking (companies), terminal operators, port
authorities and others. The system is called Port Information System (PIC).

The quality of MIS in the Port of Assab, like some developing countries' ports, is not
adequate and satisfactorily efficient. To start with, there is inconsistency of
information supplied by different departments of the same item. For example, the
operations' division report about equipment inventory does not agree with that of the
engineering division. This is because the latter evaluates any piece of equipment
from a technical point of view, while the former evaluates the piece of equipment
from the safety of cargo, safety of operators, productivity and efficiency viewpoint.
For example, the operators do not like to use old and frequently breaking down
equipment. On the other hand, the engineers consider any piece of equipment as
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available for use as soon as it is maintained irrespective of its history. So, when they
are asked what stock of equipment the port owns, they report differently.

The point is that although the real problem is unavailability of the required
equipment that affects the productivity and efficiency of the port, the lack of
consistent and accurate data is also an obstacle to the management to take the right
action at the right time.

Another impact of poor MIS is delays in processing spare parts. Damaging delays
occur in the issuing of spares from stock, and even more severe delays in procuring
non-stock items. This reinforces the need for close-and early- collaboration over this
phase of every engineering task, and the firm inter-linking of the Engineering
Management Information System (EMIS) and Supplies Management Information
System (SMIS).

The importance of supplies to maintenance must not be underestimated. The
procurement and the stores of spare parts are an integral part of maintenance. Any
weakness in those areas has a direct impact on the performance of maintenance. As
observed in the Port of Assab, most of the high downtime of equipment in the
maintenance shop is associated with weaknesses in procurement and supplies.
Among the weaknesses in supplies management of the port are included:
Ø Insufficient stocks.
Ø Incorrect stocks, because of mistakes in ordering the wrong parts or in placing
insufficient orders.
Ø Deficiencies in supplies personnel.
Ø Poor internal communication. Few incidents of failure to maintain the necessary
co-operative relationship between supplies and maintenance staff have occurred.
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There are deficiencies in system inter-linking as well. Frequently, for example, the
engineering department has no direct access to stores inventory, and so has no
knowledge of the current stock position or ready information on spare parts
designations and code numbers. In such a situation, either an unnecessary telephone
call has to be made, during which the stores staffs have to look up their own records;
or one or more visits to the stores have to be made. Besides, there is considerable
delay before the spares ‘Requisition Form’ can even be filled in.

The MIS in the Port of Assab is still a traditional one that consists of an array of
specially designed forms, on papers and card, bound and loose-leaf registers, and
card indexes of varying degrees of elaboration. There are hundreds of printed forms,
each designed for one specific activity within the sequence of documentation
procedures. The resulting assemblage of dissimilar forms does nothing to encourage
accurate and consistent recording and analysis of equipment data.

The main problems with such a conventional (paper) MIS are that it is bulky and
paper accumulates enormously and that it is time-consuming to operate effectively,
particularly its analytical component.

Obviously, the first problem is the sheer bulk of the resulting paper work. The files
of collected job cards and schedules, Asset History Cards, Requisition Forms, etc.
accumulate in vast quantities, and storage in readily accessible form becomes very
difficult. Records occupy rows of shelves in workshops and administrative officesusually subject to dust.

The second problem is that bulky files are difficult to access for analysis; indeed they
discourage managers from attempting to analyse the data on a regular basis.
Nevertheless, should there be a need to analyse the paper-based data, dedicated
engineers should thoroughly and carefully extract comparative data from the
workshop and other records, producing monthly summaries, graphs of trends in
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usage and reliability of their equipment, and even data comparing machine types and
manufactures. Consequently, this takes up large amounts of their valuable time - time
better spent on improving equipment management than on paper work with pencil
and calculator.

Another major problem concerning the traditional paper bound MIS concerns
duplication of data entries. It is inevitable that the same data such as ship particulars
are entered by all parties involved in port activities, in a lot of ‘Forms’ and ‘Cards’
for specific purposes. One department could do this only once and distributed to
others, had there been an electronic system of inter-link like of computer network
system, or specifically electronic data interchange system.

4.3.2 Inefficiency of Supervision, Motivation, and operational planning
4.3.2.1 Inefficiency of Supervision
Next to equipment breakdown, labour was the second biggest cause of idle time in
the ship to shore operation in 1996. In general, labour associated causes of idle time
include early finish, late start, strikes and so on. It is observed that most of the labour
idle time in the Port of Assab is attributed to early finish, and late start. At least three
things could be the reasons here. The first reason could be lack of supervision. That
is either the supervisors are not doing their job well or they could not influence the
dockworkers to start and quit their jobs on time. The second reason is obviously the
low morale of some of the dockworkers. Usually, low self-motivation is the result of
a bad culture of people, bad working conditions, or low remuneration.

The third reason has to do with planning. It is very possible to be able to finish cargo
operations in fewer numbers of shifts by working out careful planning and by
exercising sound co-ordination in the implementation of the plans. However, since
the planning in the Port of Assab is not done perfectly, cargo-handling operations
take more shifts than necessary.
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Shortcomings in supervision are also observed in certain areas. The performance of
tallying is officially evaluated as just average. It was believed that the main reasons
for low performance of tally clerks were insufficient supervision and poor
motivation. To solve these problems the wage of tally clerks on shipboard was
substantially increased. This did not bring the expected changes. Importers and
exporters still complain about the tallying many times and called for private tallying
instead of tally unit under the port administration, as they felt that it would better if
tallying was done by an independent body instead of the port itself.

4.3.2.2 Lack of Motivation
It is quite clear that it is not easy to motivate people. In fact, as Alain Chauval argues
(1999), it is not possible to motivate people at all, but it is easy to demotivate them.
What one can do, he further argues, is to create an environment (atmosphere) that
can motivate people.

With respect to the supply of skilled labour, Assab is located in a relatively
unsuitable position. People, especially the skilled ones, are reluctant to migrate from
the highlands, where there is more skilled labour than in other regions, to the port for
several reasons. The first reason is the climatic hazards. The climate is hot and
humid. This is a detriment to productivity mainly due to fatigue. The worst problem
is that the resignation of skilled and executive workers was high in 1997. Even those
who gained experience and skill out of the port activities resigned after they have
acquired enough skills and experience. This leaves the port with more unskilled
labour. Coupled to climatic hazards is the risk of serious contagious diseases such as
malaria. These are but external factors that prevent people from increasing their
productivity.

Moreover, it is believed that the free provision of medical care in the port clinic and
in the hospital is not a good motivation. It has, on the contrary, become a cause for
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many people to be absent from work by going frequently to see the doctor even for
very minor sicknesses. Moreover, it creates a free rider-in the sense that people do
not even take the dosages that are prescribed by the doctor.

Finally, there are occasional labour relation problems when workers go on slow
down strikes. Fortunately, no other kinds of strikes have ever taken place.
Nonetheless, there have been some incidents when some workers complain about the
lack of qualities of leadership of their supervisors.

4.3.2.3 Inadequacy of Operations Planning
Operations plans are so important to achieve optimum allocation of resources and coordination of activities.

No matter how well traffic and operations managers undertake their day-today control and supervisions, it is impossible to achieve the cargo
throughput of which the berth is capable unless operations are planned
effectively, to produce a smooth, cost effective, and balanced flow of cargo
through the port. (UCTAD, Monograph No. 4, 1985, P. 1).

Plans can be divided into three based on time scale: Short-term, Medium-term, and
Long-term. Short-term plans are made for days, weeks, and months ahead.

Short-term planning efforts involve the current allocation of the port's
facilities, equipment and manpower to meet the needs of the vessels and
cargo in the port. The planning is in response to the short-term needs of the
port users. The information used includes requests from ships' agents and
the status reports relative to the port berths, equipment and storage areas.
Typical outputs are the daily assignments of labour and equipment, the daily
or weekly berth assignments, and the weekly or monthly maintenance
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schedule. The goal of this planning is to ensure efficient cargo handling
operations, rapid vessel turn round, and reasonable levels of utilisation of
equipment and facilities. (Ma Shuo, 1999. P. 2)

Medium-term plans are made for one to three years ahead. Long-term plans are made
for at least three years and they can go up to twenty years ahead. In Eritrea, the time
scales for short-term, medium-term, and long-term plans are 1-2 years, 2-5 years, and
over 5 years, respectively.

B. J. Thomas distinguishes between three principal groups of activities in port
operations planning. The first one, which takes place before the vessel arrives, is
called pre-arrival planning. It includes such tasks as berth allocation, planning the
right labour and equipment and estimating working times. The second activity is
known as work scheduling and takes place when the vessel is alongside the berth and
covers all the preparations for the next shift. The final task, in operations planning, is
the performance review, which is undertaken when the vessel has completed the
discharging and loading of its cargo and has left the port. The main objective of this
is to closely evaluate the performance of the cargo handling operations.

The two latter planning tasks are carried out relatively well in the port of Assab.
However, the first one, the pre-arrival planning, is not done. The institutional reasons
for not doing this planning are not known for sure, but it is most probable that one
reason could be due to the shortage of specialist knowledge. The other reason could
be shortage of equipment; meaning the shortages of some highly demanded pieces of
equipment such as container lift trucks does not allow reserving these pieces of
equipment for a particular ship.

In this case the external factors used to be the major reasons that made the pre-arrival
planning very difficult. They include:
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Ø Communication and Transportation Problems. In the years between 1991-1995,
There was a serious air transportation problem. There were only two scheduled
flights between Asmara, the capital of Eritrea, or Addis Ababa, Ethiopian capital,
on the one end and the port on the other. Besides, it was not unusual for flights to
be cancelled. This was a major source of delay in the transfer of documents about
ship and cargo by air. Similarly, since for historical reason there was no direct
telephone link between Assab and Asmara, considerable delays, inconvenience
and more costs were inevitable. To minimise costs VHF radio communications
were often used. However, the Eritrean Shipping and Transit Agency Services
(ERISTAS) had to use SATCOM for speedy communications.
Ø Inaccuracies in information obtained about cargo. This was the reason, as
reported by the operations divisions, for the incorrect deployment of resources,
mainly labour.
Ø The nature of cargo itself. It is obvious that break bulk cargo that comes in small
consignments takes more time to handle than unitised and homogenous cargo.
The cargo traffic that is moved through the Port of Assab is mainly break-bulk
cargo (more than 45% excluding containerised cargo).

This research focuses on how the deficiencies in short-term operations plans affect
the efficiency and productivity of the port. In this context, it is deemed important to
explain what information is needed to carry out the short-term planning and what
items, or who is involved, in short-term plans.

In order to be able to plan effectively one needs sufficient, relevant and up-to-date
information. Ship data is just the primary information needed. Ship data consists, in
the first place, of the technical details of the ship which as a rule are already known.
Also, they provide information for the various cargoes. For import cargo this means
the ships manifest, stowage plan, and expected time for the ships despatch. For
outgoing ships an overall ships plan, loading/unloading data, the ports of call and a
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cargo list for the various destinations are needed. (UNCTAD. Manual on Port
Management, Part III. 1976. P. 13-14).

Before a ship arrives at the port, it is necessary to work out and prepare all the
information for the quayside operations. This means listing export consignments
already at the port, their weight, port of discharge, dangerous cargo. In addition, and
particularly for storage planning purpose, the present location of cargoes in the port
and consignments not yet available or to be added, with anticipated time of arrival
and information on whether they should be discharged in to a shed first or directly
into ship, are required. An important quayside detail is the storage capacity of the
sheds. This means the amount of space needed which is either already there or must
be cleared, depending on the type of goods expected and their respective properties.
This amount of space varies with the degree of mechanisation of the port.

In the case of the Port of Assab, the decisions on the various berths to be used the
next day is reached by about 10:00 a.m. of the previous day. The necessary number
of gangs and the operation methods are determined according to the services to be
provided by shipside gangs and quayside gangs of the respective sheds. The
operations manager on board a ship and the operations manager on the quay make
these decisions.
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V. Cost Benefit Analysis of Alternative Solutions

The previous chapter dealt with the major causes of low productivity and
performance of the Port of Assab. This chapter proposes some solutions, together
with their cost-benefit analyse. However, for convenience, and mainly because of
time constraints, the cost-benefit analysis is to be detailed. It is not done for all
solutions either.

5.1 Training

In spite of the increased need of skills and know-how for survival and continuation
of the organisation in the competitive environment, there is an acute and critical
shortage in certain essential fields. Providing thorough training to upgrade the skill
and know-how of existing workers can solve this problem and most of the other
major problems of the port.

In general, as Allan (1987) explains, there are three costs associated with training:

1. Establishment Cost: are costs of training organisation within the company and
typically comprises such elements as salaries, insurance, pension contribution
and all other benefits given by the company to members of that unit. This cost
could be very low for the Port of Assab because of two basic reasons. The first
reason refers to the pensions and insurance. In Eritrea a law governing insurance,
pensions contributions and other labour related laws is still under study. So, the
company is paying these contributions. Secondly, the level of salary in the
country in general, is low. Therefore, taking into account the salaries of the

53

training manager and one typist, this cost could approximately amount up to
US$4300 per annum.
2. Marginal expenditure: by this is meant the additional money which has to be
spent, in addition to establishment costs, in order to carry out any one training
activity. Atypical example of this is outside lecturers’ fees and expenses. These
are demanded by university staff, consultants, etc. hired to make a presentation to
an internally organised company course. Finding accurate figures of this type of
cost is difficult at this stage because it depends mainly on the number of courses
that will be given by outside lecturers’ per annum. Sometimes it can be free of
fees because it is possible to find volunteers and aid from special agencies, like
UNCTAD. However, it is unrealistic to assume that it would be totally without
expenses. Thus, if any course is to be given in a particular year, it might demand
up to US$10,000 outlays in the form of marginal cost.
3. Interference Costs: when one gives time and effort to training, and thus ceases to
be occupied in one main tasks, which are other than training, there is an
interference with the output with which one is primarily concerned. This
interference with normal work obviously has an associated cost. This is more or
less similar to the opportunity cost of being in training. In the Port of Assab this
component of training cost could be minimised tremendously by carrying out
efficient planning and co-ordination between the training centre and other
departments of the port; for example, by giving training during the low traffic
season (usually in the first quarter of the year).

As far as the benefits of training are concerned, there are a lot of variables to
consider before going into detail. First of all, the evaluation of the benefits of training
cannot be undertaken by restricting the study purely to those things within the limits
of the functional responsibility of the training manager. Instead, it should extend
throughout the chain as far as is deemed necessary.
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Secondly, training has short-term and long-term benefits. It is difficult to tell with
certainty the exact future benefits. That is to say there is the problem of estimating
precisely the benefits accrued to training when justifying its future benefits.

Attributablity is another problem associated with estimation of the benefits of
training. Specifically, when training is followed by an improvement in performance
it is easy to attribute the improvement to the training itself and to the technological
substance of the training. For improvement in performance that occurs after training,
it is difficult to tell exactly what the contribution of training was, and what the
contribution of other factors were.

Despite all the above difficulties in evaluating the benefits of training, there are
several obvious benefits. It is believed that these benefits can only be fully evaluated,
by comparing the ‘after training’ performance (human, mechanical or financial) with
the ‘before training’ performance.

It has been proved that in the year 1997, damage to equipment and cargo dropped
considerably as the result of short-term training given to operators of different
equipment by the mechanical engineering division.

Generally, the benefits of training can be listed as follows:

1. Reduction in human error accidents
2. Avoidance of sabotage
3. Readiness and competence of people to take responsibility
4. Reduction in mechanical and procedure problems
5. Ability of managers to understand better current approaches to commercial,
organisational and management problems
6. Decline in industrial disputes or in labour wastage
7. Addition to the quality of industrial life.
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8. Transfer of technology: Specialist skills that could not be given internally could
be acquired by sending people abroad.

In short, for a port this implies a better quality of service, reliability, and efficiency.
This good reputation could also attract more customers to use the port.

The benefits from training could also be analysed from a reduction in different cost
elements enjoyed by importers and exporters. These people can get the following
benefits as a result of improved productivity.
•

Reduced stevedoring costs

•

Higher service quality and lower ship turn-round times

•

Reduced inventory costs

•

Shortened transit time

•

Cut demurrage claims by truck operators

•

Reduced freight rate, provided that the market forces either remain constant or
decline with the reduction in port costs.

On the other hand, training gives benefits to trainees in many ways. For example, the
benefits to employees could be promotion to higher posts or higher salary. These
benefits are the after training benefits. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that
training by itself induces motivation. So, even during training there is usually high
morale on the side of the employees who get the opportunity of training.

5.2. Changes in Management Information System

It is evident that the effectiveness and efficiency of every port planning, maintenance
and operational activity depends on the availability of relevant, accurate and
comprehensive information. An appropriate MIS helps to achieve these objectives.
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The port could continue to use the conventional paper based on MIS to take
advantage of lower labour costs in relation to capital. However, if the port intends to
achieve quality, and most importantly a long-term cost effective MIS, it should look
for a computerised system. The port needs to employ a computerised MIS such as
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) and Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area
Network (WAN) system. More specifically, the policy changes in MIS should
include:

• Modern techniques of general management in the sense that there should be good
principles of delegation, management style and discipline;

• Rigorous cost accounting;
• Simplified procedures; and
• Modern communication and information technology.
The benefits of a computerised system to the conventional paper based MIS can be
presented in summary form as follows:
Ø availability of information at the right time, in the right manner, for the right
people, which implies the availability of reliable and effective data collection,
data processing as well as effective and efficient information;
Ø reduction in the cost of operations by avoiding errors, by optimal allocation of
berth, yards, equipment and labour force to tasks quickly, and
Ø reduction in the administrative and telecommunication costs.

There are, of course, certain costs associated with computerised MIS. Generally
speaking these costs include:
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Ø At the initial stage, installing modern technology is certainly going to cost a
substantial amount of money, but later on, just like any other capital investment,
this is going to diminish.
Ø Other costs associated with computerised MIS are the maintenance of the system,
the risk of bugs, and redundancy.

This, similar to structural adjustment programmes, is likely to lead, at least initially,
to a reduction in the workforce. This is particularly true in over-manned, state-owned
ports, like the Port of Assab. However, as a result of increased productivity, security
of employment for port workers could be improved.

5.3. Changes in Maintenance Management

It appears that the port needs to introduce some changes in its maintenance
management. First of all, the port needs to review its approach to maintenance and to
consider the various options and formulate an appropriate maintenance policy.
Equipment should not be maintained simply for the sake of maintenance. Costbenefit analysis of a piece of equipment should be conducted and compared against
buying a new one to ensure the rationale of maintaining existing equipment. If any
piece of equipment reaches its economic life, it should definitely be phased out.

Computer Assisted Maintenance Control (CAMC) is used in most efficient ports to
control the costs and maintenance history of equipment. The Port of Assab should
also try to apply such a good tool to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of
maintaining any piece of equipment.

The writer does not see substantial cost to be incurred due to mere changes in
maintenance policy. A limited amount of money might be expected for installing
CAMC and training or recruiting qualified staff.
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In contrast, the benefits could be really great. For instance, the result could be a
saving in maintenance costs by avoiding unnecessary maintenance. If this overhead
cost saving by the maintenance department is passed on to the port user through
reduced cargo handling costs or otherwise, it could become a source of other benefits
to the port such as the capture of new traffic or better reputation to the port.

The second change to suggest in maintenance management mainly aims at improving
the availability of equipment. Revising the organisation of shifts and staff working
times in the workshop could lead to the achievement of this goal. The introduction of
flexible working hours, at least on the part of the staff, will greatly improve
productivity. However, when implementing flexible working times in the workshop,
one must carefully examine the peak demands for maintenance as they occur during
the day, and then adopt working hours accordingly.

As long as the maintenance staff do not display any reluctance in implementing these
flexible working hours, there will not be any cost attributable to this change. Even if
staff do, the costs will be limited. To the contrary, tremendous benefits could be
obtained as a result of implementing flexible maintenance working hours. Operators’
satisfaction, reduction in overtime costs, and avoidance of unnecessary investment in
equipment to maintain the minimum required availability level are but a few of the
benefits.

Finally, outsourcing might be a possibility in the future. Currently, however,
outsourcing the maintenance of equipment does not seem possible for the simple
reason that there are no competent local engineering companies near the port. In
addition, there are no local agents for manufacturers of several types of the
equipment that the port owns. The port is the only one that owns and uses heavy
equipment in that region of the country.
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5.4 An Investment Plan

To make sure that the port does have the inventory of equipment and the facilities
necessary for the actual traffic, the development of an investment plan will be needed
for new equipment or the replacement of existing equipment and new facilities. An
investment plan is part of the port’s corporate plans. So, it is a compulsory that every
port must do this; it is not an option.

Of course, to make such a plan very detailed information regarding traffic forecasts
and equipment output will have to be gathered, but this does not imply that making
an investment plan requires significant special costs. As regards the benefits of
preparing an investment plan, they are the same as other plans. Thus, it seems there
is no need to analyse in detail the costs and benefits of preparing an investment plan.

In fact the Port of Assab does have an investment plan which is prepared for both the
ports of Eritrea by the Department of Maritime Transport. The investment plan spans
for fifteen years from 1995-2010. It needs updating because many events and
variables have already changed. This investment plan should be adhered to and
updated regularly and the inaccuracies of forecasting should not be used as an
excuse. It needs regular updating and if possible the simulation method of planning
should applied to suit inevitable changes in ship and cargo traffic and those that
influence them.

5.5 Operational Plans

Now that the external factors, such as communications and air transport, which had
been the reasons for not carrying out the pre-arrival plans, have already been solved.
The shortage of skilled labour should also be solved either by giving training or
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recruiting qualified people. Thus, the complete set of operations plans has to be
worked out in order to achieve the efficiency of cargo handling in the port.

All the three operational plans discussed in the preceding chapter should be worked
out. This is really a plus for the quality of the port services. The ship owner will be
so happy if he/she is able to know when operations in the port are going to start and
end. Better utilisation of resources, better co-ordination of different tasks and the
smoother flow of cargo handling are among other benefits.

Performing the plans is not likely to cost much. What is needed is to employ skilled
people, either by recruiting new, qualified people or by giving training to the existing
staff. The other requirement is the timely arrival of information concerning the vessel
and cargo characteristics. The information should arrive well in advance before the
ship enters the port. This is not a problem if the new technologies are applied to
improve the MIS of the port as explained above.

5.6 Port Reform

Sometimes changes in the management of internal resources or organisational
changes alone do not bring about the desired improvements in port efficiency. In
such a situation, the organisation, or the port authority for that matter, has no choice
but to consider the other options of port reform.

In general, options of port reform include:
Ø Improvement of the port administration
Ø Liberalisation (introduction of competition)
Ø Commercialisation
•

Contracting out of certain (non-core of the business) activities

•

Leasing
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Ø Corporatisation (privatisation without change of ownership)
Ø Privatisation
•

Public offer

•

Private placements

•

Management/employees buy-out (MEBO)

•

Build-operate-transfer (BOT)

•

Sale of Assets

•

Joint Ventures

In the port industry a commonly used method to apply port reform is through the
contracting out (leasing) of public services to the private sector. (De Vos Fe, 1995.
PP. 26-30)

When one is considering applying any of the above port reforms, there are two basic
remarks that must be considered:

1. Efficiency will not automatically increase
2. To limit the commercial risks to the maximum extent and probably obtain more
benefit, the port management should consider only leasing the infrastructure,
because:
•

The port management reduces its investments and therefore the financial
risks

•

The operating company will be more loyal to the port since it is requested
to make large investments in superstructure. (De Vos Fe, 1995. PP. 26-30)
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VI Conclusion and Recommendation

Starting by introducing the country’s general background and port’s background, this
dissertation then went on to present the significance of the port to the national
economy and also the significance of this study. As explained by analysing the major
causes of low productivity and performance and giving some recommendations, the
port’s role can be realised or it can play even greater roles in the national economy.

Based on the analysis made in chapter four, it is found that the major causes of lower
productivity and performance of the Port of Assab as compared to international
standards were the following:
Ø Acute and critical shortage of skilled labour and know-how, particularly in the
nautical and engineering fields;
Ø Shortage of financial resources to purchase new equipment and send people for
training abroad or to recruit expatriates to fill the gap where skills and know-how
are lacking;
Ø Deficiency in Management Information System (MIS); and
Ø Deficiency in supervision, motivation and planning.

To solve these problems alternative solutions are suggested in chapter five. In
addition, attempts are made to analyse the costs and benefits of the alternative
proposals.

It should be noted that since all the analyses are based on the facts that prevailed
before the border conflict, the recommendation is also based on that scenario. This is
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because of the belief that the current situation is a temporary emergency and the port
will likely continue its normal services as a natural gateway to Ethiopia.

The recommendations, it is admitted, could be implemented if, and only if, the
situation comes back on track to its normal situation. Otherwise, the current situation
is quite different and needs different approaches to analyse and come up with
effective new solutions. At the present, the greatest problem of the port, that is the
loss of traffic, is not institutional but something that is caused by external factors.
This is a very serious problem to the port.

Once the major problems are identified and analysed, it is necessary to make certain
recommendations. Accordingly, the following recommendations are suggested.

1.

A well-trained work force is essential for efficient port operations. The objective
of training should be to provide port workers with the skills necessary for the safe
and efficient performance of their work, to facilitate the movement of workers
across the organisation’s ladder. To this end, the writer suggests the following
training schedule to be given in the short and medium terms. This, by enhancing
the skills and know-how of the port workers, does solve most of the major
problems of the port. Therefore, the organisation should put people first in its
strategies and take steps towards the achievement of this goal, not only by
providing training but also by organising continuous human development
programmes.

It seems unrealistic to the writer to believe that the findings of this study are
sufficient to determine the exact number of trainees. It undoubtedly needs more
vigorous scrutiny and consultation with senior staff of the Port Authority. The
following suggestions are particularly aimed at solving the problems investigated
by this study. The suggestions do not include the general training needs to all port
employees.
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Familiarisation with computer operating and computer network system should be
provided to all staff with exception of those who are not going to be part of the
network system suggested as a solution to the MIS problem.

Priority
level

Trainees
Group/
Members

Trainees

Type of
Training

First

Top
Management

General
Manager and
Division
heads

Second

Operations
Division

Intermediate
managerial,
and senior
managerial
manpower

Training,
Workshop,
Seminar,
visits and
Conferences
Training, and
Seminar

Third

Fourth

Mechanical
Engineering
Unit

Procurement
and Property
Management
Unit

No.
of
train
ees
6

Short Term

Medium Term

Port Management,
Port Economics and
Finance, IPP3, IPP4,
IPP5

Port Management,
Port Economics, and
Finance, IPP3, IPP4,
IPP5

15

IPP1, IPP2, and IPP3,
logistics, Principle of
Management and
Accounting, Safety
and IMDG code. In
Service Training
IPP1, IPP2, IPP3,
Safety and IMDG
code, Warehousing
Management and
Principle of
Management
Training on the new
types of equipment to
that are to be procured
with accordance to the
Eritrean Ports
Rehabilitation Project

Supervisors,
clerical, and
junior
managerial
manpower

Training, and
Seminar

60

Drivers of
different
Equipment

Training, and
Seminar

60

Dockworkers

On the job
Training

360

Technicians

Practical
Training

36

Workshop
Foremen and
Maintenance
Planners
Intermediate
managerial,
and senior
managerial
manpower

Education
and Training

6

IPP3, and Principles of
Management and
Accoutring

IPP1, IPP2, and
IPP3, logistics,
Management and
accounting, Safety
and IMDG code. In
Service Training
IPP1, IPP2, IPP3,
Safety and IMDG
code, Warehousing
Management and
Principle of
Management
Training on the new
types of equipment
to be procured with
accordance to the
Eritrean Ports
Rehabilitation
Project
Integrated Gang
System, and training
on Safety cargo
Handling
How to maintain the
new types of
equipment to be
procured with
accordance to the
Eritrean Ports
Rehabilitation
Project
IPP3, and Principles
of Management and
Accoutring

Training and
Seminars

6

logistics, Principle of
Management and
Accounting

logistics, Principle
of Management and
Accounting

Integrated Gang
System, and training
on Safety cargo
Handling
How to maintain the
new types of
equipment to be
procured with
accordance that are to
the Eritrean Ports
Rehabilitation Project

Table 15. Proposed Training Schedule for Employees of the Port of Assab
Keys:
Education is a training that should be given by institutions or universities level
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2. The port should introduce some change to improve its performances in the
maintenance department. Changes in its maintenance policy should be introduced
such as scraping equipment when it has reached its economic life.
3. The MIS of the port should be improved by applying an EDI or a computer
networks systems so that information can be transferred or received
automatically. Within two phases the port could be inter-linked internally within
different division of the port and externally with respect to port actors such as
ships’ agents and freight forwarders, like that of Aarhus.

Million US$
Category
Component Description

Local

Foreign

Total

.
-

10,6
1,80
0,50
6,00
0,40
0,90
0,45
0,20
0,35
0,45
3,45
3,35
0,10
0,80
0,80

11,05
1,80
0,50
6,00
0,40
0,90
0,45
0,20
0,35
0,45
3,45
3,35
0,10
0,80
0,80

-

0,20
0,10
0,10
0,30
0,30
15,35

0,20
0,10
0,10
0,30
0,30
15,80

-

1 Equipment
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

Reach Stackers, 40t (4)
Reach Stackers, 15t (2)
Ship-to-Shore tower crane (2)
Mobile crane, 50t
Tugmaters (6)
Trailers (18)
Forklift truck, 15t
Forklift truck, 4t (9)
Fire fighting truck

a.
b.

Multipurpose tugboat
Retaliation pilot boats

a.

Equipment and facilities for
improving operating practices
and maritime safety.

a.
b.

Short term consultants (4mm)
Technical assistance (4mm)

a.

training

2 Marine Craft

3 Environment

4. Consultancy

6. Training

Sub-Total
Assab
Table 16 Eritrea: Ports Rehabilitation Project for 1998
Keys:
mm: Man Months
Source: Port of Assab
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%
Foreign

% Total
Base
Cost

96

70

100

22

100

5

100

1

100
100
97

2

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

100
100

100

4. Having an investment plan, which is updated regularly according to
circumstances in cargo traffic and factors that affect it, is a necessary condition.
Implementing that plan is a sufficient condition. Thus, immediate investment in
equipment is required either by borrowing from different external creditors such
as the World Bank and African Development Banks, or by direct public or
private investment. The recommendations made by the Eritrea Port
Rehabilitation Project Committee to procurement several pieces of equipment
should implemented as soon as traffic resumes if port’s productivity is to be
improved (table 16). However, the recommendation made by the same unit on
construction a container terminal should be reconsidered.

Phase 1: Proposed Computer Network within the Port of Assab
Finance

Administration

Procurement and
Property Management
Cargo Handling

Civil Engineering

Port Information
Centre
Operations

Electrical Engineering

Mechanical Engineering

Pilot Office

Transport and
Equipment

General Cargo and
Container Stacking

Figure 8.
Phase 2: Proposed Computer Network for the Port of Assab with Port Clients and Authorities
Immigration

Local Liner Agents

Customs

Port Information
Centre
Forwarding and
Trucking Company

Department of Maritime
Transport

Figure 9.

5. Finally, one might notice that the above solutions are a sort of package proposals
that are meant to improve the productivity and performance of the port as long as
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the port remains as a service port. However, many ports in the world are moving
from a ‘service port’ type to a ‘tool’ or ‘landlord’ types due to several factors
such as globalisation. Thus, it seems the right time that the Port of Assab takes
some steps in this direction; for example, it should consider privatising the
stevedoring activities as well as tallying activities.
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